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Választókörzetek kiosztása és kialakítása rangkülönbségek 
összegével  
R. SZIKLAI BALÁZS –HÉBERGER KÁROLY 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
A rangkülönbségek összege (SRD) egy innovatív statisztikai módszer, amely 
különböző megoldásokat képes összevetni egy referenciapont alapján. Ez utóbbi 
adódhat természetes módon, vagy előállítható az adatokból. Tanulmányunkban egy-
egy esettanulmányon keresztül mindkettőre mutatunk példát. A körzetkiosztási és 
kialakítási probléma két kritikusan fontos vetülete egy demokratikus választási 
eljárásnak. Elméleti szakemberek ügyes heurisztikákat találtak ki arra, hogyan lehet 
mérni az egyes kiosztások aránytalanságát, vagy a körzetek alakjának kompaktságát - 
egyik esetben sem létezik azonban legjobb módszer. Norvég és Egyesült Államokbeli 
adatokat felhasználva rangsoroljuk a leggyakrabban alkalmazott körzetkiosztó 
módszereket és kompaktsági mértékeket. A körzetkiosztási probléma esetén azt 
találtuk, hogy az összes klasszikus módszer meglehetősen jól teljesít, kis de 
szignifikáns különbségekkel. A legjobb módszernek a Leximin adódott, de némileg 
meglepő módon, a nem-reguláris Imperiali módszer is vele holtversenyben az első 
helyen végzett. A kompaktsági mértékek közül a Lee-Sallee index és az invariáns 
momentumok módszere teljesített a legjobban, bár ez utóbbi érzékeny arra milyen 





JEL: C44, K16 
Kulcsszavak: körzetkiosztás, körzetkialakítás, Gerrymandering, kompaktsági 
mértékek, többváltozós optimalizálás, Rangkülönbségek összege 
 
 
Apportionment and Districting by Sum of Ranking
Differences
Balázs R. Sziklai1,2 and Károly Héberger3
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Abstract
Sum of Ranking Differences is an innovative statistical method that ranks com-
peting solutions based on a reference point. The latter might arise naturally, or
can be aggregated from the data. We provide two case studies to feature both
possibilities. Apportionment and districting are two critical issues that emerge in
relation to democratic elections. Theoreticians invented clever heuristics to mea-
sure malapportionment and the compactness of the shape of the constituencies, yet,
there is no unique best method in either cases. Using data from Norway and the US
we rank the standard methods both for the apportionment and for the districting
problem. In case of apportionment, we find that all the classical methods perform
reasonably well, with subtle but significant differences. By a small margin the Lex-
imin method emerges as a winner, but – somewhat unexpectedly – the non-regular
Imperiali method ties for first place. In districting, the Lee-Sallee index and a novel
parametric method the so-called Moment Invariant performs the best, although the
latter is sensitive to the function’s chosen parameter.
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Comparing apples and oranges is never easy. But what if we are forced to do so? Fair
division methods are hard to compare as each one was designed with a different goal
in mind. One way to deal with the problem is axiomatic analysis. Finding out which
method satisfies which fairness properties and make a choice based on this analysis. Policy
makers, however, might need to evaluate the efficiency of their measures or need to justify
their decisions by providing some numerical evidence. Thus, another stream of literature
focuses on quantifying different aspects of the methods and comparing them numerically
– Sum of Ranking Differences (SRD) follows this path.
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to promote SRD, a novel statistical method
which is rapidly gaining popularity in various fields of applied science, such as analytical
chemistry (Andrić, 2018; Brownfield and Kalivas, 2017), pharmacology (Ristovski et al.,
2018), decision making (Lourenço and Lebensztajn, 2018), and finance (see case study No.
2 in (Kollár-Hunek and Héberger, 2013)) and which can be also potentially interesting
to the Political Science and Social Choice community. Secondly, to use this method to
analyse two notoriously divisive issues related to proportional representation. These two
issues represent two typical problem sets in social choice literature: fair division and fair
assessment problems.
SRD allows us to select the most adequate solution among outcomes with different
features based on a reference point. This situation is very common in multiobjective
optimization, where the decision maker has to choose between many possible Pareto-
optimal outcomes (Lourenço and Lebensztajn, 2018). The problem analogous to fair
division, where solutions satisfy different sets of fairness criteria. Since these criteria are
usually conflicting, meaning there is no universally best solution, the decision maker has
to choose one among them.
There are a number of problem instances where this kind of analysis can be valu-
able. Possible applications include, among others, the comparison of resource allocation
schemes (e.g. cooperative game theoretical solutions, cake cutting rules) and the ranking
of different measures (e.g. voting power indices, centrality measures). Thus, SRD can be
applied to a wide variety of problems. Here we demonstrate its usefulness by ranking
the solutions of two frequently studied problems in Political Science: apportionment and
districting. The first can be characterized as a fair division problem while the second
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belongs to fair assessment. Ricca et al. (2017) provides a very nice introduction to both
topics.
The idea of proportional representation is prevalent in parliamentary democracies.
Elections are considered fair if each voter has approximately the same amount of influence
on the outcome. In most democratic countries, some members of the House are elected
directly in single member constituencies. These constituencies are created by dividing up
larger administrative regions, e.g. counties or states. To ensure equal representation, the
seats of the House have to be distributed among these administrative units in proportion
to their population1. In other words, the sizes of the constituencies have to be more or less
the same. What makes this task difficult is that allocating a fixed number of seats among
counties of different sizes often leads to divisibility issues. As fractional seats cannot be
allotted, we have to decide which county gets more and which one gets less seats than its
fair share.
Legislative bodies, both in the US and in Europe advocate that proportionality should
be the key factor in apportionment. In the US, the 14th amendment already established
proportionality as a fundamental principle (Balinski and Young, 1975). In Europe the
Venice Commission, the advisory body of the Council of Europe in the field of consti-
tutional law also attested that equality of voting power should be achieved by creating
constituencies of equal size (Venice Commission (2002), Section 2.2, §13-15).
Even-sized constituencies are a necessary but not sufficient condition for proportional
representation. Elections are often manipulated by gerrymandering - the redesign of
constituency boundaries with the intention to favour one of the parties2. As a result some
constituencies obtain an unnatural, grotesque shape. Constituency boundaries may be
affected by the geography of the region, by administrative or historic boundary lines, or
because of the concentration of a specific national minority, but often the sole reason of
districting is to manipulate the outcome of the election. Hence, there is a fine line between
districting for valid reasons and gerrymandering.
To combat this weakness, US states impose a number of standards for redistricting.
1Some countries consider total population, while others the number of voters. In some cases these
base numbers are further adjusted (e.g. with the area of the county) to compensate for other factors.
Most notably, rural areas are often treated better, in order to avoid a situation where the Members of
the Parliament represent only a geographically small part of the country.
2Ansolabehere and Palmer (2016) find that 20% of the congressional districts of the US remarkably
lack compactness, while The American Prospect reports that ”Close to a hundred congressional seats and
thousands of state legislative seats have been strategically drawn to be noncompetitive at the expense of
all other interests” (https://prospect.org/power/slaying-partisan-gerrymander/ [09/25/2019]).
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In addition to contiguity requirements, many states have a compactness clause in their
election law, some even prescribe basic compactness tests3. Still, most statutes are so
vague4, that it makes it very difficult to challenge the design of constituencies at court
based on compactness issues alone. Although many algorithms have been proposed to
mathematically define and measure compactness, it is not yet clear which approach is the
most relevant one.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we describe the methodology,
we introduce the SRD method and give a detailed example. In Section 3, we analyse the
apportionment and districting problem through case studies. Finally, we conclude by
pointing out interesting future research directions.
2 SRD
Sum of ranking differences is a simple but effective statistical tool to rank and numerically
assess different solutions based on a reference (Héberger, 2010; Héberger and Kollár-
Hunek, 2011).
The input of an SRD analysis is an n × m matrix, where the first m − 1 columns
represent the different models (measurement techniques, Pareto-optimal outcomes), while
the rows represent the measured variables (properties). In the following we will refer to
the columns as solutions, and the rows as objects. The last column of the matrix has a
special role. It contains the benchmark values, called references, which form the basis of
comparison. From the input matrix we compose a ranking matrix by replacing each value
in a column – in order of magnitude – by its rank. Then SRD values are obtained by
computing the absolute differences between the column ranks and the reference ranking
and summing them up.
2.1 Reference values
SRD requires a reference value for each object. In some cases, justified reference values are
available (prescriptions, earlier measurements). In the absence of a known gold standard,
these reference values have to be extracted from the data. This step is called the data
3For a complete list, see http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-tablestate.php.
4For example, Idaho (72-1506/4) requires ”To the maximum extent possible, the plan should avoid
drawing districts that are oddly shaped.”
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fusion (Willett, 2013). Depending on the type of data, this can be done by a number of
ways. Here we list the most common methods.
• Average (arithmetic mean). Not only the random errors but the systematic ones
(biases) of different methods, and/or different measurement techniques follow nor-
mal distribution. If average is used in the data fusion act, the errors cancel each
other out supported by the maximum likelihood principle and empirical evidences
(Youden, 1997).
• Minimum/maximum. Error rates, residuals, misclassification rates, etc. often can be
grasped with the minimum values. Row maximum is a suitable gold standard for the
best classification rates, correlation coefficients etc. Row maxima and minima should
be chosen whenever objects are maximized or minimized under optimal conditions.
Such a selection of a benchmark is equivalent to defining the hypothetically “best”
method with the smallest error, best classification, etc.
• Median. A ”self-evident” substitute for the mean for asymmetric distributions, in
the presence of outliers.
2.2 SRD step by step
SRD is not solely a distance metric, but a composite procedure including data fusion
and validation steps. Here we describe how it works in details. In addition, SRD is
summarized on an animation procedure as a supplementary file in Bajusz et al. (2015).
An SRD toolbox in MS Excel macro format is available at: http://aki.ttk.mta.hu/srd.
i. Data fusion: The definition of a reference (benchmark) depends on the features of
the data set. The background philosophy is similar to proficiency testing (interlabo-
ratory comparisons), where laboratories and techniques are compared using Z-scores
with the assumption of normality (Youden, 1997). Reference is either a known gold
standard, or computed row-wise as the function of the first m− 1 column values.
ii. Converting the data matrix: We create a ranking matrix by replacing each value
in the column by its rank. That is, for each column (including the reference) take
the smallest value in the column and replace it with ’1’, take the second smallest
value and replace it with ’2’, and so on. Finally, the last remaining value, which was
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the largest of the original column values, is replaced by ’n’. Ties in column vectors
are resolved by giving the same rank to cells with the same value: the arithmetic
mean of the ranks. This tiebreaking mechanism is called fractional ranking and is
the standard in all statistical tests that deal with rankings.
iii. Computing the SRD values: We calculate the (absolute) ranking differences between
the reference and solution vector coordinates and sum them up. The SRD values
are, in fact, city block (Manhattan) distances, and they rank the solutions. The
smaller the SRD value the closer the solution is to the benchmark, i.e. the better.
The mutual proximity of SRD values indicates the specific grouping of variables.
iv. Validation: To remain comparable within various data sets (and different number
of rows) the normalized SRD values (scaled between 0 and 100) are calculated. The
permutation test (also called randomization test, denoted by CRRN = comparison
of ranks with random numbers) shows whether the rankings are comparable with
a ranking taken at random or they are different from it significantly. The second
validation option is called cross-validation, and assigns uncertainties to the SRD
values. Leave-one-out cross-validation is applied if the number of rows is less than
14. Leave-many-out cross-validation is applied for larger number of rows in the
input matrix.
2.3 Validation
SRD values follow a discrete distribution that depends on the number of rows. If n
exceeds 13 the distribution can be approximated with the normal distribution well5. By
convention we accept those solutions that are below 0.05, that is, below the 5% significance
threshold. Between 5-95% solutions are not distinguishable from random ranking, while
above 95% the solutions seem to rank the objects in a reverse order (with 5% significance).
The second validation step is cross-validation, where we repeatedly compute the SRD
values, while one seventh of the objects is left out. This can be done in blocks or by select-
ing random rows. If the number of objects is small only one row is left out in each step.
The median of the normalized SRD values are computed for each solution. The medians
are then compared with Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test (henceforward Wilcoxon
5The difference is already negligible for n > 10, but for values n ≤ 13 the SRD distribution is provided
in the SRD toolbox (see the reference in Section 2.2.)
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test) to obtain a grouping of the solutions. The Wilcoxon test is a non-parametric sta-
tistical hypothesis test that can be used to compare two related samples. It is a common
alternative to the paired Student’s t-test (also known as ”t-test for dependent samples”)
when the sample size is small and the population cannot be assumed to be normally
distributed.
Cross-validation is similar to a Monte Carlo simulation where we randomly generate
data and test the different methods. Generating random data might be difficult as the
underlying distribution is often unknown, thus new, smaller datasets are produced by
sampling the rows. Note, that we did not make any assumption on the independence
of the objects. Indeed, SRD works fine even when there is some dependency between
the objects. Cross-validation, however, might contain some noise if the solutions are not
consistent. A solution is inconsistent if upon receiving a sub-set of the objects as input,
assigns different values for those objects, than what the solution prescribed for the same
sub-set for the original problem. This noise can be eliminated by computing the solutions
for the smaller problems during each step of the cross-validation.
2.4 Example
Now we demonstrate how SRD values are computed. Table 1 compares a couple of mobile
phones based on the technological benchmark values of six features (Battery, Performance,
Storage, etc.). In order to compare the features, the benchmark values are normalized.
Note that this example is illustrative – in the case studies, the objects we analyse are of
the same kind. Reference indicates the desired parameters. Phone A has a little more
battery life and better camera than Phone B, but inferior in other aspects. First, we
compute the ranks for both of the phones and the reference values. The smallest number
in the column of Phone A is the RAM, so it will be the first in the ranking. The second
smallest number in the column is the CPU performance, which therefore is ranked second,
and so on. Notice that in case of Phone A, display and storage tie for the 3rd and 4th
place, thus they each get an average rank of 3.5. Similarly, in case of Phone B, storage
and RAM ties for 4th and 5th place, so they get an average rank of 4.5.
After we computed the column ranks, we compare them with the reference ranking.
SRD values are obtained by first taking the absolute difference of a column ranking with
the reference ranking objectwise, then summing up the differences. In the example, Phone
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Features Phone A Rank Diff. Phone B Rank Diff. Reference Rank
Battery 0.814 5 0 0.793 3 2 0.750 5
Performance 0.661 2 1 0.700 1 0 0.594 1
Storage 0.681 3.5 0.5 0.844 4.5 0.5 0.719 4
Camera 1.000 6 0 0.975 6 0 1.000 6
RAM 0.587 1 2 0.844 4.5 1.5 0.703 3
Display 0.681 3.5 1.5 0.709 2 0 0.625 2
SRD values 5 4
Table 1: Calculation of the SRD values.
Samples SRDA SRDB Diff. Abs. Unsigned ranks Signed ranks.
Gr1 5 1 4 4 6 6
Gr2 3 4 -1 1 2 -2
Gr3 4 2 2 2 4.5 4.5
Gr4 5 4 1 1 2 2
Gr5 1 2 -1 1 2 -2
Gr6 2 4 -2 2 4.5 -4.5
Table 2: Cross-validation – the computation of the Wilcoxon test.
B is somewhat closer to the expectation, than Phone A.
Table 2 demonstrates the steps of the Wilcoxon test. Each row represent an SRD
computation for a sub-set of the objects. As n is small, leave-one-out cross-validation is
applied. That is, the Gr1 row was obtained by leaving out the first row, Gr2 by leaving out
the second, and so on. The Diffs. column shows the differences of SRD scores, while the
next column their absolute value. The latter is then used to create a ranking, tiebreaking
is again resolved by fractional ranking. Finally, we reapply the signs, that is, ranks that
originated from a negative difference are multiplied by (−1).
The last column is used to calculate the test statistics, W which is the minimum of two
values: the sum of positive ranks (W+) and the sum of negative ranks (W−). W follows
a specific distribution with an expected value of zero and which for large n converges to
normal distribution. In the example, W = min{6 + 4.5 + 2, 2 + 2 + 4.5}=8.5 under which
we reject the null-hypothesis and conclude that Phone B is closer to the reference.
The results are visualized in Figure 1. The boxplots represent the the first two column
of Table 2, that is, how the SRD scores ranged in the cross-validation. For comparability
reasons, SRD scores are normalized with the maximum possible difference, which is 12 for
5 objects. The whiskers indicate the minimum and maximum values, in case of Phone A
these are 0.833 = 1/12 and 0.4166 = 5/12. The boxes indicate the range between the first
and third quartile. Note that, since in this example we had only 6 data entries for each
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Figure 1: Cross Validation - ’<’ indicates that the solutions significantly differ (at the 5%
level) according to the Wilcoxon test.
solution, the 2nd and the 5th largest values were chosen as the first and the third quartile.
The Wilcoxon test tells us whether the difference between the boxplots is significant.
3 Case studies
In this section we demonstrate how SRD can be helpful in fair division and fair assessment
situations. To be conform with the terminology of the apportionment literature, in the
mathematical description we will use ’state’ instead of ’county’.
3.1 The Apportionment Problem
In the apportionment problem we have a finite number of seats, which have to be dis-
tributed among states with different populations. The problem is analogous to the dis-
tribution of seats between parties, which received different number of voters during the
elections. Brill et al. (2018) also showed that many apportionment methods can be formu-
lated as multiwinner approval rules. The US was the first modern country that adopted
sophisticated apportionment techniques. Balinski and Young (1975) give a comprehensive
historical overview of the theoretical and political debate that surrounded the introduc-
tion and evolution of apportionment methods in the US. Here we restrict ourselves to
discussing the main challenges and the proposed solutions that emerged in the past two
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centuries. First, we introduce some notation.
3.1.1 Mathematical framework
Let m denote the number of states in the country. An apportionment problem is a pair
(p, H) that consists of a vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) of state populations, pi ∈ N+ and a
positive integer H ∈ N+ denoting the number of seats in the House. An apportionment
method determines the non-negative integers a1, a2, . . . , am with
∑m
i=1 ai = H, specifying
how many seats each of the states 1, 2, . . . ,m obtains. Formally, it is a function M
that assigns an allotment for each apportionment problem (p, H).6 Furthermore, let
P =
∑m








as the respective share of state i.
3.1.2 Properties of apportionment methods
Apportionment rules can be classified into three categories: largest remainder methods,
divisor methods and optimization methods. Each of the three approaches possess some
unique trait that the others do not.
One of the most basic properties of apportionment is the so-called Hare-quota: if exact
proportional allocation of the seats is not possible due to divisibility issues, it is reasonable
to find an allotment nearest to the respective shares of the states. Formally, each state
should be allotted at least as many seats as the lower integer part of its respective share
(lower quota). Conversely, no state should obtain more seats than the upper integer part
of its respective share (upper quota). When an apportionment method satisfies both
upper- and lower-quota, we say it has the Hare-quota property.
Largest remainder methods were designed to exhibit this property. The best known
such method is the Hamilton-method (sometimes also called Vinton-method), which first
assigns each state its lower quota, then the remaining seats are distributed one-by-one to
the states with the largest fractional parts of their respective shares. The Droop method
is calculated in a similar way, but the states’ respective share is obtained by dividing





. This results in different lower quota, and different
fractional parts.
6Note that apportionment methods usually do not include any tiebreaking mechanism. A general
assumption in the literature is that all the pi values are different, which is virtually always true for real
instances.
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Hamilton-method, as all largest remainder methods, is vulnerable to monotonicity
issues, which was the main reason why it was abandoned by US legislators. The most
famous monotonicity paradox is the Alabama-paradox. Statisticians observed, that in-
creasing the House size sometimes result in less seats for some states. Another para-
doxical phenomenon is when a dynamically growing state is losing seats against a state
with smaller population growth (Tasnádi, 2008). Hamilton-method is neither House- nor
population-monotone. In addition, it also suffers from the New State and Elimination
paradoxes (see Balinski and Young (1982) and Jones et al. (2019) for further details).
Divisor methods are immune to monotonicity paradoxes. A divisor method is char-
acterized by a monotone increasing function f : N → R, the so-called divisor criterion.
The pi
f(s)
value is the rank-index or claim of state i when it has s seats. Seats are allo-
cated to the states one-by-one to the state with the highest claim until all the seats are
distributed. It is a general assumption that during the allotment no ties occur, that is all
the pi
f(s)
values are distinct. In this paper we analyzed the following divisor methods (EP
stands for Equal Proportions method – aliases are due to reinventions):
Adams method f(s) = s
Huntington-Hill/EP method f(s) =
√
s(s+ 1)
Sainte-Laguë/Webster method f(s) = s+ 1/2
Jefferson/D’Hondt method f(s) = s+ 1
Imperiali method f(s) = s+ 2
Macau method f(s) = 2s
We say that a divisor method is regular if the divisor criterion is bounded between s
and s + 1, that is s ≤ f(s) ≤ s + 1. Regular divisor methods have a particular feature:
Notice that the listed divisor criteria are pointwise increasing – the methods favour large
states over small states in the same order. That is, the Adams method favours small
states, while the Jefferson/D’Hondt is the most beneficial for large states (see also refs.
(Balinski and Young, 1982; Lauwers and Van Puyenbroeck, 2006; Marshall et al., 2002)).
Also regular divisor methods may violate either the lower- or the upper-quota, but never
11
Methods Hare-quota Monotonicity properties VC’s recommendation
Largest remainder methods 3 7 7
Divisor methods 7 3 7
Optimization methods 7 7 3
Table 3: Properties of apportionment methods. 3 indicates that the solution satisfies,
while 7 indicates that it violates the given property.
both. Non-regular methods like the Imperiali- and Macau methods, may violate the
upper- and lower-quota at the same time.
Optimization methods compose the third branch of apportionment methods. The
Burt-Harris method (Burt and Harris, 1963; Edelman, 2006) minimizes the maximum
disparity in representation between any two states, while the Leximin method (Biró et al.,
2015), lexicographically minimizes the maximum departure, that is, the difference between
the population of any constituency and the average constituency size.
The Venice Commission, the advisory body of the Council of Europe in the field
of constitutional law, published The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters in 2002
(Venice Commission, 2002), which was consequently used in reviewing Albania’s and Esto-
nia’s electoral law in 2011 (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, 2011; OSCE/ODIHR,
2011). Instead of monotonicity properties this guidebook focuses on the equality of voting
power. Optimization methods are the only methods that are conform with the recom-
mendation of the Venice Commission.
There is a slight difference between the recommendation and the Hare-quota require-
ment. The Hare-quota specifies how many seats a state should receive at least and at
most. If a state gets less than its lower quota, then the allotment can be considered
somewhat unfair from the point of view of that particular state. The recommendation of
the Venice Commission is concerned rather with the individual voter. If the population
sizes of the constituencies differ too much so does the voters’ influence. In Europe, where
the countries consist of small and in some sense uniform counties the latter makes more
sense. Interestingly, the US Supreme Court also ruled that no deviation from equality is
too small to challenge as long as a plan with less inequality can be presented (see the case
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969)). But this only applies within state. Across states there
seems to be no restrictions – this is why currently the voters of Rhode Island have 88%
more influence than the voters of Montana (Biró et al., 2015). Table 3 summarizes the









Vinton EP Webster D’Hondt Harris
Østfold 282 000 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9.43
Akershus 566 399 19 20 18 19 19 20 21 10 18 19 18.95
Oslo 623 966 21 21 20 21 21 22 23 10 20 20 20.88
Hedmark 193 719 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 9 7 7 6.48
Oppland 187 254 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 6 6 6.26
Buskerud 269 003 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9.00
Vestfold 238 748 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 7.99
Telemark 170 902 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 9 6 6 5.72
Aust-Agder 112 772 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 8 4 4 3.77
Vest-Agder 176 353 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 9 6 6 5.90
Rogaland 452 159 15 15 15 15 15 16 16 10 15 15 15.13
Hordaland 498 135 17 17 16 17 17 17 18 10 16 16 16.67
Sogn og
108 700 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 8 4 4 3.64
Fjordane
Møre og
259 404 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8.68
Romsdal
Sør-
302 755 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10.13
Trøndelag
Nord-
134 443 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 8 5 5 4.50
Trøndelag
Nordland 239 611 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 8.02
Troms 160 418 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 8 6 5 5.37
Finnmark 74 534 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 7 3 3 2.49
Table 4: Comparison of apportionment methods on Norwegian data. Abbreviations: HH:
Huntington-Hill, EP: Equal Proportions, SL: Sainte-Laguë
3.1.3 Case study of Norway
The choice of apportionment method often depend on cultural and historical character-
istics of the country. Even if the decision maker has a clear preference over the three
properties (cf. Table 3), each class contains several methods to choose from. Which
one performs best on the given data is still up to debate. Since apportionment is also
used to distribute seats between parties after the elections, the apportionment method
is often challenged in countries with a fragmented parliament. To evaluate the different
candidates, malapportionment measures have been proposed (Benoit, 2000; Koppel and
Diskin, 2008; Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Schubert and Press, 1964; Wada and Kamahara,
2018). SRD follows this literature and offers yet another way to help this difficult choice.
In apportionment, there is a natural candidate for reference point: the respective
shares of the states (note that these are non-integer numbers). To demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of SRD we use population data from Norway7. Table 4 shows the sizes of counties,
their respective shares and the apportionments proposed by the different methods.
The data are typical in the sense, that the solutions prescribed by the different methods
are very similar8. Given that the apportionment may significantly affect the outcome
of the election even small differences matter. The computation of the SRD values are
displayed in Table 7, the results of the CRRN analysis is shown in Figure 2.
7In Norway, apportionment is based on the number of voters adjusted by the size of the county. Here
we use the raw population data (Sta, 2013) as after adjustment most of the solutions coincide, hence
there is no point in comparison.






















Figure 2: Comparison of ranks with random numbers. All (normalized) SRD values fall
outside the 5% threshold (XX1: 5% threshold, Med: Median, XX19: 95% threshold).
The black curve is a continuous approximation of the cumulative distribution function of
the random SRD values.
With the exception of the exotic Macau method all apportionment methods perform
well. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Imperiali method, a non-regular divisor method, shares
first place with the Leximin method. This is even more perplexing considering that
the Imperiali method does not satisfy exact quota. That is, the Imperial method may
not produce a perfectly proportional allocation even if such exists. The reason becomes
clear when we consider how the Imperiali method handles the quotas. Oslo the largest
administrative region gets more seats than its upper quota, while Finnmark, the smallest
county gets less than its lower quota. Note, that SRD is insensitive for this kind of bias, the
ranking does not change if the largest receives more, or if the smallest obtains less seats.
Although the Imperiali seems to favor large states even more than the Jefferson/D’Hondt
method, it treats the middle more fairly.
Although the Macau method is inferior compared to the other methods, it still falls
outside of the 5% threshold, which means that it is better than a random ranking. Cross-
validation also reveals how the solutions are organized (see Fig. 3). According to the
Wilcoxon test, the Leximin and the Imperiali methods perform significantly better than
the Adams or Jefferson/D’Hondt method. The latter two is significantly better, than the




Figure 3: Cross Validation - The Wilcoxon test arranges the solutions into four equivalence
classes. ’∼’ indicates that there is no significant difference between the solutions, while
’<’ indicates that the solutions significantly differ (at the 5% level).
Note that, in the Apportionment problem the rows of the data matrix are dependent in
the sense that the total allotment should be equal to the House size. Thus, cross-validation
might contain some noise for solutions that are not consistent. Divisor methods are not
affected since they are coherent9 (Palomares et al., 2016), meaning they assign the same
allotment for a sub-set of the objects. This might not be the case for largest remainder
methods and optimization methods. Overall the result should be robust as errors are
scarce and cancel out, but for a precise ranking the solutions should be recalculated in
each step during the cross-validation.
3.2 Case study No 2: Districting
Ever since US Senator Elbridge Gerry redesigned Essex County’s state senate districts
in 1812 to help his re-election, districting is under the spotlight of public attention and
there is a continuous academic debate on how legislators ought to do it and how the court
should deal with the problematic cases. Figure 4 demonstrates how a politically balanced
9In Social Choice literature, consistency is the most common expression used to describe this property
(Thomson, 2012). In apportionment, the terminology is less consistent and coherence, consistency and
uniformity have been equally used.
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Figure 4: Politically competitive districts (left) vs. gerrymandered districts (right)
state can be apportioned to favour one of the parties. Although, here compactness is
not an issue, in real life voters are distributed much more erratically and gerrymandered
districts tend to have a weird shape.
One of the main questions of districting is whether to construct politically competitive
districts, where voters have diverse interests, or to promote proportionality by creating ho-
mogeneous districts for all numerically significant sets of political opinions in the electorate
(Stern, 1974). The picture is further complicated by the fact that residential patterns and
human geography may cause ’unintentional gerrymandering’, whereby one party’s voters
are more geographically clustered than those of the opposing party (Chen and Rodden,
2013). A more recent discussion focuses on how district level competitiveness relates to
the marginal benefit of parties’ efforts to mobilize voters, and how competitiveness can
be measured (Blais and Lago, 2009; Cox et al., 2019).
Perhaps the most controversial case in the US is the ’earmuffs’ of Chicago, the 4th
congressional district of Illinois (Fig. 5, left). The constituency which consists of mainly
latino voters practically enfolds the 7th district (Fig. 5, right), a predominantly black
community. The thin line that connects the northern and souther block and ensures the
contiguity of the district is an uninhabited highway. The reason (or rather the excuse) of
the design is to make sure that both the latino and the black communities are represented
in the congress. In reality, this is nothing more than segregation by race, that ignores all
cultural aspects: the neighborhood to the north is primarily Puerto Rican, and the one
to the south is primarily Mexican-American.
Stern (1974) warns, that single-member districts drawn to guarantee minority repre-
sentation create several problems (e.g. the group representing the majority interest in the
given district loses incentive for nominating competitive candidates). On the other hand,
Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) argue that districting plans that maximize the homogene-
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Figure 5: The 4th (left) and 7th (right) congressional districts of Illinois, 108th Congress
of the United States.
ity of preferences within each district eliminate policy bias between the median voter and
the elected legislature.
It is a delicate issue whether the shapes of the 4th and 7th district of Illinois are
justified or not, and discussing it would bring us far from the subject of this paper. Yet,
these constituencies give us an excellent idea how hand-drawn districts look like where
compactness of the constituency was disregarded.
3.2.1 Compactness measures
Compactness has been strongly advocated by legal and political experts as a remedy for
partisan gerrymandering (Stern, 1974; Polsby and Popper, 1991; Chambers and Miller,
2013). A related stream of literature focuses on measuring redistricting changes, see e.g.
(Crespin, 2005) and the references therein.
There is an intensive debate on what and how compactness measures need to test. For
instance, the Iowa Code (2018) prescribes that both the length-width difference and the
perimeter of a district should be minimal and the total length-width difference and the
total perimeter distance computed for all individual districts in a plan can be compared
to an alternative districting plan.
In contrast, many compactness measures compare the shape of a constituency to an
ideal formation10: a circle or rectangle. Here we review some of the classical measures as
well as a novel method recommended recently by Nagy and Szakál (2018).
The Polsby-Popper test (Polsby and Popper, 1991) compares the area of the district
10Not all compactness measures assume an ideal shape. Chambers and Miller (2010) suggest a path-
based measure without specifying an ideal form.
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to the area of a circle with the same perimeter as the district. The Reock test (Reock,
1961) compares the area of the district to the area of the smallest circle within which the
district will fit. The Lee-Sallee test (Lee and Sallee, 1970) again considers a circle with
the same area as the district and places it in such way that the center of mass of the
two shapes coincides, then takes the ratio of the area of their intersection and the area of
their union. The Moment Invariants comes from image processing and also considers the
circle the most compact shape. The Length-to-width test takes the (absolute) difference
between the distances of the Westernmost and Easternmost points and the Southernmost
and Northernmost points of the district (Harris, 1964).
Formally, let D represent the set of geometric shapes corresponding to the constituen-
cies. We denote the area of a constituency D ∈ D as A(D), while let P (D) be its
perimeter. Furthermore, let C ′ be the smallest circumscribed circle of D, and C ′′ a circle
such that A(C ′) = A(D), and the center of mass for C ′′ and D coincides.







A(D ∩ C ′′)
A(D ∪ C ′′)













, if β ∈ (−1, 0).
All the above measures range between 0 and 1, and CPP (D) = CR(D) = CLS(D) =
CβMI(D) = 1 ⇔ D is a circle. To make the Length-to-width measure comparable to the
other measures we transform the values into the [0, 1] interval. Let LW (D) stand for
the length-width difference of district D, then we standardize the data with the following
formula






Mom. Inv. Mom. Inv. Mom. Inv. Lee-
Reock
Polsby- Length-to- Reference
(β = −0.5) (β = 1) (β = 2) Sallee Popper width (Avg)
Arkansas 1st 0.936 0.810 0.584 0.721 0.396 0.144 0.924 0.645
Arkansas 2nd 0.924 0.640 0.301 0.582 0.311 0.221 0.693 0.524
Arkansas 3rd 0.940 0.698 0.365 0.619 0.328 0.327 0.824 0.586
Arkansas 4th 0.947 0.753 0.474 0.617 0.394 0.260 0.292 0.534
Iowa 1st 0.944 0.790 0.527 0.655 0.388 0.403 0.980 0.670
Iowa 2nd 0.895 0.504 0.170 0.483 0.208 0.255 0.720 0.462
Iowa 3rd 0.881 0.544 0.224 0.445 0.254 0.302 0.025 0.382
Iowa 4th 0.948 0.758 0.483 0.610 0.428 0.468 0.549 0.606
Iowa 5th 0.945 0.729 0.399 0.654 0.273 0.323 0.418 0.534
Kansas 1st 0.950 0.734 0.430 0.790 0.387 0.431 0.000 0.532
Kansas 2nd 0.854 0.577 0.298 0.439 0.355 0.230 0.353 0.443
Kansas 3rd 0.910 0.743 0.472 0.619 0.389 0.355 0.942 0.633
Kansas 4th 0.923 0.655 0.332 0.549 0.346 0.467 0.343 0.516
Table 5: Compactness measures for various congressional districts of the 107th Congress
of the United States (Source: (Nagy and Szakál, 2018) and own compilation)
3.2.2 Comparing compactness measures
To test how compactness measures perform on real data, we use the dataset provided in
(Nagy and Szakál, 2018), where compactness of the congressional districts of Arkansas,
Iowa and Kansas are compared (Table 5 and Fig. 6). Unlike to the apportionment prob-
lem, in districting there is no natural reference point. Since the ideal shape, a circle, has
a compactness measure of 1, and generally the greater the value the more compact the
shape is, the best (maximum) or worst (minimum) values could be potential reference
points. Notice however, that although all compactness measures map into [0, 1], some of
them have a preferred subinterval. For instance, the Lee-Sallee index ranges between 0.4
and 0.8, while the Polsby-Popper between 0.1 and 0.5. Choosing the maximum values
would effectively result in setting the Moment Invariants with (β = −0.5) as the reference.
The minimum values are no better as they almost always coincide with the Polsby-Popper
scores. Hence, in this case, the minimum or maximum values do not allow the objective
comparison of these measures. Instead we opt for a third candidate and set the average
as the reference point.
Theoretical and practical arguments equally support this choice. Firstly, if we think
of the compactness measures as tests that estimate compactness with some error, then by
taking the average these errors cancel out by the maximum likelihood principle. The fact
that the measures capture completely different aspects of compactness actually strengthen
this point, as it is less likely that the average is affected by some kind of systematic bias.
Secondly, if a policy maker has to decide which measure to impose as a legal requirement,
she might prefer to choose something close to the average as she doesn’t want her decision
to be challenged.
Table 8 displays the computation of SRD values, Figure 7 shows the result of CRRN
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Figure 6: Congressional districts of Arkansas, Iowa and Kansas, 107th Congress. (Source:
US Census Bureau (2000))
test. There are a couple of interesting observations to make. In contrast to apportionment,
here we see great distances between the SRD values. Moreover, even the best SRD scores
are not that good - there is room for improvement. The Moment Invariant measures
obtained some of the best and worst SRD scores, which indicates that the parameter
of the function should be chosen carefully. Nagy and Szakál (2018) suspect, based on
empirical observations, that the most effective interval for the β parameter is [1, 3]. Indeed
β = −0.5 is second worst among the solutions and just barely falls outside the error limit.
Finally, the most apparent feature is that the Polsby-Popper test falls within the error
limit, that is, it cannot be distinguished from random ranking.
Cross-validation (Fig. 8) confirms that there is no significant difference between Mo-
ment Invariants with β = 1 and β = 2 and the Lee-Sallee index. The triumvirate is
followed by the Length-to-width test, then by the Reock test and Moment Invariant with
β = −0.5, which again do not differ significantly. Finally comes, lagging somewhat be-
hind, the Polsby-Popper test. In this case, objects are independent, no consistency-issues
arise.
Arguably, measuring compactness is a complicated, multi-dimensional problem. The
bad SRD score of the Polsby-Popper test might only indicate that this test measures a
different aspect of the problem. On the other hand, this can be said basically about every
other tests. Table 6 summarizes the relative distances of the solutions. One-by-one, we





















Figure 7: Comparison of ranks with random numbers (cf. Fig 2). Great distance between
the SRD values.
other solution. The Polsby-Popper test, as expected, is quite far away from the other
measures, but so is the Length-to-width test, and none of them seems to be particularly
close to each other (with the exception of the Moment Invariants with β = 1 and β = 2).
If we think of the average value as a collective wisdom that reflects the judgment of all
the measures, then one may be inclined to say that the Polsby-Popper test is unsuitable
for measuring compactness of constituencies. We do not wish to formulate such a strong
claim. A sample of 13 districts is hardly big enough to make such a generalization. Further
analysis is needed to resolve this issue.
Nevertheless, this result has a practical consequence. Policy makers that seek to reform
districting law and impose a compactness requirement might be less inclined to propose
the Polsby-Popper test. Since the test’s measurements are off from the average, its results
can be easily challenged by an adverse party armed with a different measure.
4 Summary and conclusion
Sum of Ranking Differences is a novel statistical method, which can be valuable for testing
competing solutions in Political Science and Social Choice. We provided two case studies





Figure 8: Cross Validation. ’∼’ indicates that there is no significant difference between
the solutions, while ’<’ indicates that the solutions significantly differ.
former we looked at the apportionment of the Norwegian parliamentary seats. For the
latter we considered the compactness of the constituencies of three US states.
In the apportionment problem, all the methods under examination – with the excep-
tion of the Macau-method – performed very well. Although the Leximin method fit the
data the best, it was only slightly better than classical solution methods. Overall, opti-
mization methods produced better SRD values than largest remainder methods. However,
to announce a clear ranking of the methods more tests are needed. Interestingly, the non-
regular Imperiali method performed just as well as the Leximin method. The likely cause
Table 6: The relative heat map shows the distances between solutions measured in SRD
score, when the reference is set one-by-one as one of the solutions.
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is, that the Imperiali method may violate both the upper- and lower quota in the same
time, and SRD does not penalize this behavior. Still, the outstanding SRD score indicates
that the Imperiali method is not just another exotic apportionment method, but a viable
alternative to the classical rules.
In the districting problem, the SRD values covered a far greater range. A novel
parametric method, the Moment Invariants performed very well compared to the classical
compactness measures when the parameter was chosen carefully, that is for β = 1 and
β = 2. However, for β = −0.5 the method fares poorly. The SRD score of the Polsby-
Popper test was no better than an SRD value of a random ranking, which suggests that the
test measures a different dimension of compactness. Further analysis is needed to decide
whether the test is suitable for measuring the compactness of constituencies. In reality,
the reliability of compactness measures are limited as they do not take into account the
natural boundaries (e.g. coastlines). This can be avoided by looking at the redistricting
problem on a higher level and compare total compactness of competing redistricting plans.
In summary, SRD seems to be an excellent tool in comparing solutions in various fields
of applied science. Initial steps has been already taken to provide theoretical foundations
for its success. Lourenço and Lebensztajn (2018) showed that SRD provides a smaller set
of optimal solutions from among the possible groupings of similar solutions of the Pareto
front. An axiomatic analysis of SRD would further strengthen its reliability.
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Ristovski, J. T., N. Janković, V. Borčić, S. Jain, Z. Bugarčić, and M. Mikov (2018). Eval-
uation of antimicrobial activity and retention behavior of newly synthesized vanilidene
derivatives of meldrum’s acids using qsrr approach. Journal of Pharmaceutical and
Biomedical Analysis 155, 42–49.
26
Samuels, D. and R. Snyder (2001, October). The value of a vote: Malapportionment in
comparative perspective. British Journal of Political Science 31 (04), 651–671.
Schubert, G. and C. Press (1964). Measuring malapportionment. The American Political
Science Review 58 (2), 302–327.
Stern, R. S. (1974). Political gerrymandering: A statutory compactness standard as an
antidote for judicial impotence. The University of Chicago Law Review 41 (2), 398–416.
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5.1 Computation of SRD values in the apportionment problem
County Hamilton Diff. Droop Diff. Adams Diff. EP Diff. Webster Diff.
Reference
ranking
Finnmark 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Sogn og Fjordane 2.5 0.5 3 1 2.5 0.5 3 1 2.5 0.5 2
Aust-Agder 2.5 0.5 3 0 2.5 0.5 3 0 2.5 0.5 3
Nord-Trøndelag 4.5 0.5 3 1 4 0 3 1 4.5 0.5 4
Troms 4.5 0.5 5 0 6.5 1.5 5 0 4.5 0.5 5
Telemark 7.5 1.5 7.5 1.5 6.5 0.5 7.5 1.5 7.5 1.5 6
Vest-Agder 7.5 0.5 7.5 0.5 6.5 0.5 7.5 0.5 7.5 0.5 7
Oppland 7.5 0.5 7.5 0.5 6.5 1.5 7.5 0.5 7.5 0.5 8
Hedmark 7.5 1.5 7.5 1.5 9 0 7.5 1.5 7.5 1.5 9
Vestfold 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10
Nordland 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 11
Møre og Romsdal 13 1 13 1 13 1 13 1 13 1 12
Buskerud 13 0 13 0 13 0 13 0 13 0 13
Østfold 13 1 13 1 13 1 13 1 13 1 14
Sør-Trøndelag 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15
Rogaland 16 0 16 0 16 0 16 0 16 0 16
Hordaland 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17 0 17
Akershus 18 0 18 0 18 0 18 0 18 0 18
Oslo 19 0 19 0 19 0 19 0 19 0 19
SRD values 9 9 8 9 9





Finnmark 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Sogn og Fjordane 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.5 3.5 1.5 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.5 2
Aust-Agder 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.5 3.5 0.5 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.5 3
Nord-Trøndelag 4 0 4 0 3.5 0.5 4 0 4.5 0.5 4
Troms 5 0 6 1 3.5 1.5 6.5 1.5 4.5 0.5 5
Telemark 7.5 1.5 6 0 10.5 4.5 6.5 0.5 7 1 6
Vest-Agder 7.5 0.5 6 1 10.5 3.5 6.5 0.5 7 0 7
Oppland 7.5 0.5 8.5 0.5 10.5 2.5 6.5 1.5 7 1 8
Hedmark 7.5 1.5 8.5 0.5 10.5 1.5 9 0 9 0 9
Vestfold 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10
Nordland 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 10.5 0.5 11
Møre og Romsdal 13 1 13 1 10.5 1.5 13 1 13 1 12
Buskerud 13 0 13 0 10.5 2.5 13 0 13 0 13
Østfold 13 1 13 1 10.5 3.5 13 1 13 1 14
Sør-Trøndelag 15 0 15 0 10.5 4.5 15 0 15 0 15
Rogaland 16 0 16 0 17.5 1.5 16 0 16 0 16
Hordaland 17 0 17 0 17.5 0.5 17 0 17 0 17
Akershus 18 0 18 0 17.5 0.5 18 0 18 0 18
Oslo 19 0 19 0 17.5 1.5 19 0 19 0 19
SRD values 8 7 33 8 7
Table 7: Rankings induced by the various solutions and difference from the reference
ranking
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(β = −0.5) (β = 1) (β = 2) ranking
Iowa 3rd 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
Kansas 2nd 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 2
Iowa 2nd 3 0 1 2 1 2 3 0 3
Kansas 4th 5 1 5 1 5 1 4 0 4
Arkansas 2nd 6 1 4 1 4 1 5 0 5
Kansas 1st 13 7 8 2 8 2 13 7 6
Arkansas 4th 11 4 10 3 10 3 7 0 7
Iowa 5th 10 2 7 1 7 1 10 2 8
Arkansas 3rd 8 1 6 3 6 3 8 1 9
Iowa 4th 12 2 11 1 11 1 6 4 10
Kansas 3rd 4 7 9 2 9 2 9 2 11
Arkansas 1st 7 5 13 1 13 1 12 0 12
Iowa 1st 9 4 12 1 12 1 11 2 13
SRD value 18 10 10 10





Iowa 3rd 2 1 6 5 2 1 1
Kansas 2nd 7 5 3 1 5 3 2
Iowa 2nd 1 2 4 1 9 6 3
Kansas 4th 6 2 12 8 4 0 4
Arkansas 2nd 4 1 2 3 8 3 5
Kansas 1st 8 2 11 5 1 5 6
Arkansas 4th 11 4 5 2 3 4 7
Iowa 5th 3 5 7 1 6 2 8
Arkansas 3rd 5 4 8 1 10 1 9
Iowa 4th 13 3 13 3 7 3 10
Kansas 3rd 10 1 9 2 12 1 11
Arkansas 1st 12 0 1 11 11 1 12
Iowa 1st 9 4 10 3 13 0 13
SRD value 17 23 15
Table 8: Rankings induced by the various solutions and difference from the reference
ranking
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